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The Moroccan community living abroad has followed with astonishment and deep resentment the demands made by a parliamentarian from the Federation of the Democratic Left regarding a pardon for those convicted in the Gdeim Izik camp events. These demands were made without regard for the human tragedies caused by those events, the lives lost among the martyrs of duty from the public forces, and the necessity of respecting the feelings of the victims' families and honoring their sacrifices. However, what intensified the resentment and touched the conscience of many Moroccans worldwide was not merely the raising of the general amnesty demand, but its coupling with a call to strip the royal institution of its pardon power and transfer it to Parliament. This appeared to them as an overstepping of the debate on a specific judicial and political file toward a deeper issue concerning the position of the royal institution and its constitutional prerogatives, leading them to question the boundaries between demanding reconciliation and respecting national memory and the constitutional choices of the Kingdom.
From time to time, calls arise demanding the transfer of the pardon power from the royal institution to Parliament, under banners such as expanding legislative powers, strengthening parliamentary oversight, and establishing the separation of powers. These titles appear on the surface to be related to the discourse of constitutional reform, but they require scrutiny before they turn into ready-made political demands or are presented as mere procedural adjustments in the distribution of competencies.
Not everything proposed in the name of reform is necessarily reform, and not every transfer of competence from one institution to another is an automatic development of the constitutional structure. There is a difference between improving the exercise of an existing constitutional competence and redistributing competencies in a way that alters the position of a constitutional institution within the entire political system.
First: Pardon is not a single concept
From a constitutional perspective, it is incorrect to confuse individual pardon with general amnesty; because confusing them leads to inaccurate conclusions.
Article 58 of the 2011 Constitution clearly states that the King exercises the right of pardon. This relates to individual pardon. As for general amnesty, it falls within the scope of law according to Article 71, and is considered one of the areas in which Parliament has the power to legislate.
Furthermore, Article 49 makes the draft law for general amnesty a subject for deliberation in the Council of Ministers. Article 78 makes the legislative initiative shared between the Head of Government and members of Parliament.
This means that Parliament is not outside the scope of pardon, nor is it deprived of legislating on it; rather, the Constitution grants it the possibility of contributing to the production of legal rules related to general amnesty according to established procedures.
Why, then, is it requested to withdraw the individual pardon from the royal institution and assign it to Parliament, even though Parliament already possesses a constitutional space to intervene in general amnesty?
The issue is not merely expanding the competence of Parliament, but relates to redistributing an existing constitutional competence, which requires a deeper institutional discussion than just raising the slogan of reform.
Second: Point 31 of the Autonomy Initiative… What does it actually say?
Following the criticisms faced by the parliamentary intervention regarding the pardon for those convicted in the Gdeim Izik camp events, Omar Mahmoud Benjelloun, in a post published to defend his position, relied on Point 31 of the Moroccan Initiative for Negotiating an Autonomy Statute for the Sahara, deposited with the United Nations in April 2007.
The existence of this provision should not be denied, nor should its content be distorted; Point 31 indeed speaks of the Kingdom adopting a general amnesty, and stipulates the exclusion of prosecutions, arrests, detention, imprisonment, and intimidation, whenever they are based on facts covered by the amnesty.
But the real debate begins here, and it seems that citing Point 31 was either bypassed or not given the necessary scrutiny.
The text does not speak of an absolute pardon, nor does it grant comprehensive and open immunity for all facts and acts, but links the scope of the pardon to a clear constraint: that the facts must be covered by the amnesty. This is not a fleeting linguistic detail, but a constraint that defines the substantive scope of the pardon. Not every act that occurred in the context of the Sahara conflict automatically becomes covered by the amnesty, and citing Point 31 is not sufficient to prove that every subsequent conviction necessarily falls within its scope.
Moreover, the initiative dates back to April 2007, while the Gdeim Izik events took place in November 2010. The existence of a provision for general amnesty in a document prior to the events does not in itself prove that the facts subject to the issued judgments are covered by that amnesty.
Another point is that Point 31 falls within transitional measures related to the process of approving and implementing the autonomy system, and is read in its integrated context with neighboring provisions, especially those related to reintegration and return to the homeland.
Therefore, citing it as a political reference for reconciliation or settlement is one thing, and saying that it automatically grants a pardon for specific facts and judicial rulings issued after the adoption of the initiative is another.
Here it appears that the excuse may be worse than the mistake itself; Point 31, which was presented as a decisive response, contains at its core the constraint that first requires proving its applicability to the facts in question: "whenever they are based on facts covered by the amnesty."
So where is the evidence that the facts subject to the judgments issued regarding the Gdeim Izik events specifically fall within the facts covered by the amnesty in the initiative?
Citing a valid document does not make the wrong conclusion correct. Also, the existence of a political provision in a negotiating initiative does not turn it, by mere citation, into an enforceable law or an executed pardon decision, nor does it exempt one from distinguishing between the political reference for settlement and the legal and constitutional conditions for its implementation.
Third: From general amnesty to transferring individual pardon… Where does the confusion lie?
Even if we concede the existence of a political basis for discussing general amnesty within the framework of settling the Sahara conflict, this does not justify automatically moving to the demand to withdraw the individual pardon from the royal institution.
The two matters are different in nature, reference, and competence. General amnesty is a legislative field, while individual pardon is a constitutional competence exercised by the King according to Article 58.
A provision in the Autonomy Initiative related to general amnesty cannot be used as a pretext to redefine another constitutional competence, or presented as a legal argument for the necessity of transferring it to Parliament.
We are facing two separate issues, even if they meet in the use of the word pardon: the first relates to the possibility of legislating on general amnesty and its conditions and scope, and the second relates to the position of individual pardon within the constitutional structure.
Confusing them does not serve the constitutional debate, but rather confuses its boundaries, and turns a political demand open to discussion into an entry point for rearranging competencies and institutions.
Fourth: Parliament is an institution for legislation, not a platform for redefining the state
No one disputes Parliament's right to propose laws, discuss them, and oversee government work, nor the right of its members to raise issues they deem worthy of public debate. These are at the core of its representative and legislative function.
However, a distinction must be made between exercising these powers and treating Parliament as if it possesses, through the mere initiative of one of its members, the power to redistribute constitutional competencies or redefine the position of institutions within the political system.
The royal institution is not merely an administration whose competencies can be transferred by a fleeting political decision, but is a constitutional institution with its position and functions in the structure of the Moroccan state, with all the associated considerations of continuity, balance, and institutional cohesion.
Any political actor has the right to discuss constitutional choices and propose their revision, but public opinion also has the right to ask about the theoretical and political backgrounds of these proposals, and about their potential effects on the balance of institutions and the stability of the constitutional system.
Furthermore, criticizing public policies and questioning the government does not necessarily mean redefining the position of the royal institution, just as developing parliamentary performance does not require Parliament to take over all the competencies exercised by other institutions.
Fifth: A single membership does not grant its holder the power to rearrange the state
It is not about confiscating the deputy's right to express or propose, nor about diminishing the value of the parliamentary initiative regardless of the number of its proponents; democratic institutions are based on freedom of debate and diversity of opinions, even when they are contrary to prevailing trends.
But there is a difference between the deputy's right to put forward a proposal and presenting that proposal as if it expresses a legislative will or an existing institutional consensus.
The deputy in question holds one membership in a chamber consisting of 395 deputies. He has the right to propose whatever he wishes, and to defend his proposal with constitutional and political arguments. But this right does not grant him a mandate to redefine the constitutional choices of the state, nor does it make his personal opinion an institutional position of Parliament.
And if it is his right to demand a review of the state's choices, it is also the right of public opinion to demand that he review some of his certainties, and to distinguish between a political proposal based on a precise constitutional reading and jumping from a provision related to general amnesty to a demand aimed at transferring the individual pardon.
As for turning the debate into an exchange of labels and accusations, such as talking about "generals of the ruling party's tanks" or "public entities," it adds nothing to the argument, and does not compensate for what it may lack in legal foundation or political clarity. Disagreement in opinion is not resolved by distributing descriptions, but by the ability of each party to defend its thesis with argument and proof.
Conclusion: What is overlooked when sheltering under a borrowed cloak
Constitutional reform is not a game of words, nor an occasion to use legal provisions out of their contexts, nor a selective process where we take what serves a political position and overlook what restricts it and defines its scope.
Whoever wants to discuss general amnesty should discuss it within its legislative and constitutional framework, and whoever wants to propose a review of the individual pardon competence should bear the responsibility of discussing the effects of that on the constitutional structure and the position of institutions, without taking shelter in a provision that does not even speak about the subject itself.
Defending reconciliation does not require canceling its conditions, defending transitional justice does not exempt one from defining facts and responsibilities, and demanding reform does not grant its holder the right to jump over the distinction between constitutional competencies.
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